Afierce competition is underway to define a new age in international affairs. A small number of countries—principally Russia, with the partnership of Iran and North Korea, as well as China—are determined to alter the foundational principles of the international system. While their forms of governance, ideologies, interests, and capabilities differ, these revisionist powers all want to entrench autocratic rule at home and assert spheres of influence abroad. They all wish to resolve territorial disputes by coercion or force and weaponize other countries’ economic and energy dependence. And they all seek to erode the foundations of the United States’ strength: its military and technological superiority, its dominant currency, and its unmatched network of alliances and partnerships. While these countries are not an axis, and the administration has been clear that it does not seek bloc confrontation, choices these revisionist powers are making mean we need to act decisively to prevent that outcome.
When President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris came into office, these revisionist powers were already aggressively challenging U.S. interests. These countries believed that the United States was in irreversible decline at home and divided from its friends abroad. They saw an American public that had lost its faith in government, an American democracy that was polarized and paralyzed, and an American foreign policy that was undermining the very alliances, international institutions, and norms that Washington had built and championed.
President Biden and Vice President Harris pursued a strategy of renewal, pairing historic investments in competitiveness at home with an intensive diplomatic campaign to revitalize partnerships abroad. This twin-pillared strategy, they believed, was the best way to disabuse competitors of their assumptions that the United States was declining and diffident. These were dangerous assumptions, since they would lead the revisionists to continue undermining the free, open, secure, and prosperous world that the United States and most countries seek. It’s a world where countries are free to choose their own paths and partners, and where the global economy is defined by fair competition, openness, transparency, and broad-based opportunity. A world where technology empowers people and accelerates human progress. A world where international law, including the core principles of the UN Charter, is upheld, and universal human rights are respected. A world that can evolve to reflect new realities, give voice to emerging perspectives and players, and meet the shared challenges of the present and future.
The Biden administration’s strategy has put the United States in a much stronger geopolitical position today than it was four years ago. But our work is unfinished. The United States must sustain its fortitude across administrations to shake the revisionists’ assumptions. It must be prepared for the revisionist states to deepen cooperation with one another to try to make up the difference. It must maintain its commitments to and the trust of its friends. And it must continue to earn the American people’s confidence in the power, purpose, and value of disciplined American leadership in the world.
BACK IN THE GAME
The United States’ strategic fitness rests in large measure on its economic competitiveness. That is why President Biden and Vice President Harris led Democrats and Republicans in Congress in passing legislation to make historic investments to upgrade infrastructure, bolster the industries and technologies that will drive the twenty-first century, recharge the manufacturing base, boost research, and lead the global energy transition.
These domestic investments constituted the first pillar of the Biden administration’s strategy, and they have helped American workers and businesses power the strongest U.S. economy since the 1990s. The United States’ GDP is larger than that of the next three countries combined. Inflation has fallen to some of the lowest levels among the world’s advanced economies. Unemployment has held at or below four percent for the longest stretch in more than 50 years. Household wealth has reached a record high. And while too many Americans are still struggling to make ends meet and prices are still too high for many families, the recovery has slashed poverty and inequality and spread its benefits to more people and more places.
These investments in American competitiveness and the success of the United States’ rebound are powerfully attractive. After Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022—the largest-ever investment in climate and clean energy—South Korea’s Samsung committed tens of billions of dollars to manufacturing semiconductors in Texas. Japan’s Toyota put billions of dollars toward making electric vehicles and batteries in North Carolina. All five of the world’s top semiconductor manufacturers have pledged to build new plants in the United States, investing $300 billion and creating over 100,000 new American jobs.
The United States is now the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment. It is also the largest provider of foreign direct investment, showing the unmatched power of the American private sector to expand economic opportunity around the world. These investments don’t just benefit American workers and communities. They also reduce the United States’ dependencies on China and other revisionists and make the country a better partner to countries that want to reduce their dependencies, too.
While some friends worried at first that the Biden administration’s domestic investments and incentives would threaten their economic interests, with time, they have seen how American renewal can redound in their favor. It has boosted demand for their goods and services and catalyzed their own investments in chips, clean tech, and more resilient supply chains. And it has allowed the United States and its friends to continue driving technological innovation and setting technological standards that are crucial to safeguarding their shared security, values, and welfare.
PARTNERS IN PEACE
The second pillar of the Biden administration’s strategy was to reinvigorate and reimagine the United States’ network of relationships—enabling Washington and its partners to pool their strength in advancing a shared vision for the world and compete vigorously yet responsibly against those seeking to undermine it.
Competing vigorously means using all the instruments of U.S. power to advance U.S. interests. It means enhancing the United States’ force posture, military and intelligence capabilities, sanctions and export control tools, and mechanisms for consulting with allies and partners so that the country can credibly deter—and, if necessary, defend against—aggression. While Washington doesn’t seek to climb up the ladder of escalatory actions, it must prepare for and manage greater risk.
Competing responsibly, meanwhile, means maintaining channels of communication to prevent competition from veering into conflict. It means making clear that the United States’ goal is not regime change and that even as both sides compete, they must find ways to coexist. It means looking for ways to cooperate when it serves the national interest. And it means competing in ways that benefit the security and prosperity of friends, instead of coming at their expense.
China is the only country with the intent and the means to reshape the international system. President Biden made clear early on that we would treat Beijing as the United States’ “pacing challenge”—its most consequential long-term strategic competitor. We undertook determined efforts to protect the United States’ most advanced technologies; defend American workers, companies, and communities from unfair economic practices; and push back against China’s growing aggression abroad and repression at home. We set up dedicated channels with friends to share Washington’s assessment of the economic and security risks posed by Beijing’s policies and actions. We nevertheless resumed military-to-military communication and underscored that serious disagreements with China wouldn’t prevent the United States from maintaining strong commercial relations with the country. Nor would we allow friction in U.S.-Chinese relations to preclude cooperation on priorities that matter to the American people and the rest of the world, such as dealing with climate change, stopping the flow of synthetic drugs, and preventing nuclear proliferation.
On Russia, we had no illusions about President Vladimir Putin’s revanchist aims or the possibility of a “reset.” We did not hesitate to act forcefully against Moscow’s destabilizing activities, including its cyberattacks and interference in U.S. elections. At the same time, we worked to reduce nuclear danger and the risk of war by extending the New START treaty and launching a strategic stability dialogue.
We were similarly clear-eyed when it came to Iran and North Korea. We increased diplomatic pressure and strengthened the U.S. military’s force posture to deter and constrain Tehran and Pyongyang. The Trump administration’s unilateral and misguided exit from the Iran nuclear deal freed Tehran’s nuclear program from its confinement, undermining the security of the United States and its partners. We demonstrated to Iran that there was a path back to a mutual return to compliance—if Iran was willing to take it—while maintaining a robust sanctions regime and our commitment that Iran will never be permitted to obtain a nuclear weapon. And we made clear our willingness to engage in direct talks with North Korea, but also that we would not submit to its saber rattling or its preconditions.
The Biden administration’s commitment to compete vigorously yet responsibly along these lines took away the revisionists’ pretext that the United States was the obstacle to maintaining international peace and stability. It also earned the United States greater trust from its friends—and, along with it, stronger partnerships.
We worked to realize the full potential of these partnerships in four ways. First, we recommitted to the country’s core alliances and partnerships. President Biden reassured NATO allies that the United States would honor its pledge to treat an attack on one as an attack on all; reaffirmed the country’s ironclad security commitments to Japan, South Korea, and other allies in Asia; and restored the G-7 to its role as the steering committee of the world’s advanced democracies.
Second, we infused U.S. alliances and partnerships with new purpose. We elevated the Quad—the partnership with Australia, India, and Japan—and took concrete steps to realize a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, from enhancing maritime security to manufacturing safe, effective vaccines. We launched the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, marshaling the world’s biggest economic partnership to shape global standards for emerging technologies and protect the United States’ and Europe’s most sensitive innovations. We raised the ambition of critical bilateral relationships, such as the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership, and revived regional engagement, with President Biden hosting summits with leaders from Africa, Latin America, the Pacific Islands, and Southeast Asia.
We made NATO bigger, stronger, and more united than ever.
Third, we knit together U.S. allies and partners in new ways across regions and issues. We launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which brings together 14 countries representing 40 percent of the world’s GDP to build more secure supply chains, combat corruption, and transition to clean energy. We created AUKUS, a trilateral defense partnership through which Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have teamed up to build nuclear-powered submarines and deepen their scientific, technological, and industrial cooperation.
Fourth, we built new coalitions to address new challenges. We rallied a variety of governments, international organizations, businesses, and civil society groups to manufacture and distribute hundreds of millions of free COVID-19 vaccines, end the acute phase of the pandemic, save lives, and strengthen the world’s capacity to prevent and respond to future health emergencies. We launched a global coalition to address the scourge of illicit synthetic drugs and a regionwide effort to share responsibility for the historic migration challenges in the Western Hemisphere.
In building these and other coalitions, the Biden administration has always made fellow democracies its first port of call. It’s why the president launched the Summit for Democracy, bringing together democratic leaders and reformers from every region. But if the goal is to solve the problems facing the American people, democracies can’t be the United States’ only partners. The evolving opportunities and risks of artificial intelligence, for example, need to be addressed through multiple coalitions that include nondemocracies, so long as they want to deliver for their citizens and are willing to help solve shared challenges. That is why the Biden administration worked with the rest of the G-7 to develop governance frameworks for AI and then led more than 120 countries—including China—in the UN General Assembly to craft and pass the first-ever UN resolution on leveraging AI for good. And it’s why the administration crafted a framework for the responsible development and use of military AI that more than 50 countries have signed on to.
REACTING TO REVISIONISM
While our strategy shored up the foundations of the United States’ strength at home and abroad, our statecraft capitalized on that strength to turn a crisis into opportunity. In the Biden administration’s first year, we made significant progress in deepening alignment with allies and partners on our approach to strategic competition. Conversations in allied capitals led to a palpable shift. For example, in negotiations to shape a new strategic concept for NATO, I saw that allies were, for the first time, intensely focused on the challenge China posed to transatlantic security and values. In my discussions with officials from allied countries in East Asia, I heard them grappling with how to respond to Beijing’s coercive behavior in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
Putin’s decision to try to wipe Ukraine off the map—along with China’s decision first to provide Russia with cover and then fuel its aggression—accelerated the convergence of views among Asian and European countries about the seriousness of the threat and the collective action required to address it. Before Russia’s invasion, we took a number of steps to prepare: warning the world of Moscow’s impending aggression, sharing intelligence with allies, sending military support for Ukraine’s self-defense, and coordinating with the EU, the G-7, and others to plan immediate and severe economic sanctions on Russia. We learned hard lessons during the necessary but difficult U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, lessons about everything from contingency planning to allied coordination, and we applied them.
When Putin ultimately launched his full-scale invasion, NATO swiftly moved troops, aircraft, and ships as part of its Response Force, reinforcing the alliance’s eastern flank. The EU and its member states surged military, economic, and humanitarian aid into Ukraine. The United States created the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which grew to more than 50 countries working with the Ukrainian military to fill urgent needs. And a broad coalition of countries imposed the most ambitious sanctions ever, freezing more than half of Russia’s sovereign assets.
Because it was an attack not just on Ukraine but also on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity at the heart of the UN Charter, Putin’s war stoked fears beyond Europe. If Putin had been allowed to proceed with impunity, would-be aggressors everywhere would have taken note, opening a Pandora’s box of conflict. China’s decision to aid Russia underscored the degree to which the fates of U.S. allies in Europe and Asia were tied together. Until that point, many in Europe continued to see China primarily as an economic partner—even if they were increasingly wary of relying too much on Beijing. But when Beijing made its choice, more and more Europeans saw China as a systemic rival.
The longer Putin pressed on with his war, the more Russia relied on the support of its fellow revisionists to stay in the fight. North Korea delivered trainloads of weapons and ammunition, including millions of artillery rounds and ballistic missiles and launchers, in direct violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. Iran built a drone factory in Russia and sent Moscow hundreds of ballistic missiles. And Chinese companies quickened their supply of the machines, microelectronics, and other dual-use items Russia needed to churn out weapons, munitions, and other materiel.
The more dependent Russia became on their support, the more the revisionists expected—and got—in return. Putin agreed to share Russia’s advanced weapons technology with North Korea, exacerbating an already grave threat to Japan and South Korea. He and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un revived a Cold War–era pact pledging to provide military aid if either one went to war. Russia increased military and technical support to Iran and accelerated negotiation of a strategic partnership with the country, even as Tehran continued to arm, train, and fund proxies who carried out terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel and partners in the Middle East and international shipping in the Red Sea. Russia and China’s cooperation has expanded across nearly every domain, and the two countries have staged increasingly aggressive and wide-ranging military exercises, including in the South China Sea and the Arctic.
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have complicated histories and divergent interests, and their partnerships with one another do not come close to the United States’ long-standing alliance architecture. Underneath their grand claims of friendship and support, these countries’ relationships are largely transactional, and their cooperation entails tradeoffs and risks that each may find more distasteful over time. That’s especially true for China, whose economic health at home and standing abroad are threatened by the global instability fomented by its revisionist partners. And yet all four revisionists share an abiding commitment to the overarching objective of challenging the United States and the international system. That will continue to drive their cooperation, especially as the United States and other countries stand up to their revisionism.
The Biden administration’s answer to this growing alignment has been to accelerate convergence among allies about the threat. We made NATO bigger, stronger, and more united than ever, with the alliance welcoming in Finland and Sweden despite their long history of nonalignment. At the start of the administration, nine of 30 NATO members were meeting their commitment to spend two percent of their GDP on defense; this year, at least 23 of 32 allies will meet that mark.
We have deepened and modernized U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific, strengthening the U.S. military’s force posture and capabilities by signing new agreements to upgrade bases from Japan to the Philippines to the South Pacific. And we have found new ways to weave allies together. In 2023, President Biden held the first-ever trilateral Leaders’ Summit with Japan and South Korea at Camp David, where the three countries agreed to increase cooperation to defend against ballistic missile attacks and cyberattacks from North Korea. This year, he hosted the first-ever trilateral summit with Japan and the Philippines at the White House, where the three parties committed to deepening joint efforts to defend freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
THE GREAT CONVERGENCE
Arguably the most consequential shift we achieved has not been within regions but across them. When he launched his invasion, Putin thought he could use Europe’s reliance on Russian gas, oil, and coal to sow division and weaken its support for Ukraine. But he underestimated the resolve of European countries—and the willingness of allies in Asia to help them.
Japan has committed more than $12 billion in assistance to Ukraine, and in June, it became the first country outside Europe to sign a ten-year bilateral security agreement with Kyiv. Australia has provided more than $1 billion in military aid to Ukraine and is part of a multinational coalition training Ukrainian personnel in the United Kingdom. South Korea has declared that it will consider supplying weapons to Ukraine, in addition to the considerable economic and humanitarian support it is already providing. The United States’ Indo-Pacific partners are coordinating with Europe to levy sanctions on Russia and cap the price of Russian oil, shrinking the amount of money Putin can funnel into his war machine.
Meanwhile, China’s support for Russia—and the administration’s innovative use of intelligence diplomacy to reveal the breadth of that support—has further focused U.S. allies in Europe on the threat posed by Beijing. The massive economic disruption caused by Putin’s invasion has made real the catastrophic consequences that would result from a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, through which roughly half of the world’s commercial container ships pass every year. More than 90 percent of the world’s most advanced semiconductors are manufactured in Taiwan.
When the Biden administration came into office, key European partners were determined to gain autonomy from the United States while deepening economic ties with China. Since the invasion, however, they have reoriented much of their economic agenda around “de-risking” from China. In 2023, the EU adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act to reduce its dependence on China for the inputs required to manufacture products such as electric vehicles and wind turbines. In 2024, the EU launched new initiatives to further bolster its economic security, including improvements to its screening of foreign and outbound investments, research security, and export controls. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania pulled out of China’s “17+1” investment initiative in central and eastern Europe. Italy left China’s Belt and Road Initiative. And a growing number of European countries, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have banned Chinese tech companies from providing equipment for their critical infrastructure.
As secretary of state, I don’t do politics; I do policy.
Friends in both Europe and Asia have also joined the United States in taking coordinated action to address China’s unfair trade practices and manufacturing overcapacity. This year, the Biden administration raised targeted tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum, semiconductors, and critical minerals—as opposed to sweeping tariffs across the board that raise costs for American families—and the European Union and Canada imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. We learned hard lessons from the “China shock” of the first decade of this century, when Beijing unleashed a flood of subsidized goods that drowned American industries, wrecked Americans’ livelihoods, and devastated American communities. To make sure history doesn’t repeat itself and to compete with China’s distortionary tactics, we are investing more in the productive capacity of the United States and its friends—and putting in place greater protections around those investments.
When it comes to emerging technologies, the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia are increasingly working together to maintain their collective edge. At our urging, Japan and the Netherlands joined the United States in taking measures to prevent China from gaining access to the most advanced semiconductors and the equipment used to produce them. Through the Quantum Development Group, we assembled nine leading European and Asian allies to strengthen supply chain resilience and deepen research and commercial partnerships in a technology with capabilities that exceed even the most powerful supercomputers.
From the moment Russia launched its war, some in the United States argued that U.S. support for Ukraine would divert resources from the challenge of China. Our actions have proved the opposite: standing up to Russia has been crucial to bringing about unprecedented convergence between Asia and Europe, which increasingly see their security as indivisible. This shift is a consequence not only of fateful decisions made by Moscow and Beijing. It is also a product of fateful decisions made by U.S. allies and partners—choices that Washington encouraged but did not, would not, and could not dictate.
The global coalition supporting Ukraine is the most powerful example of burden sharing I’ve seen in my career. While the United States has provided $94 billion in support for Ukraine since Putin’s full-scale invasion, European, Asian, and other partners have contributed nearly $148 billion. Significant work remains to boost the capabilities of U.S. allies in Europe and Asia through a combination of greater coordination, investment, and industrial base integration. The American people expect and U.S. security demands that allies and partners shoulder more of the burden for their own defense over time. But the United States is in a demonstrably stronger position in both consequential regions today because of the bridge of allies we have built. And so, for that matter, are America’s friends.
REVISIONISM ACROSS REGIONS
The destabilizing effects of the revisionists’ growing assertiveness and alignment go well beyond Europe and Asia. In Africa, Russia has unleashed its agents and mercenaries to extract gold and critical minerals, spread disinformation, and aid those trying to overthrow democratically elected governments. Rather than support diplomatic efforts to end the war in Sudan—the world’s worst humanitarian crisis—Moscow is fueling the conflict by arming both sides. Iran and its proxies have taken advantage of the chaos to revive illicit arms trafficking routes in the region and exacerbate unrest. Beijing, meanwhile, has averted its gaze from Moscow’s belligerence in Africa while fostering new dependencies and saddling more countries with unsustainable debt. In South America, China, Russia, and Iran are providing military, economic, and diplomatic support to Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian government in Venezuela, reinforcing his conviction that his regime is impervious to pressure.
The revisionist alignment is playing out even more intensely in the Middle East. Russia once supported UN Security Council efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions; now, it is enabling Iran’s nuclear program and facilitating its destabilizing activities. Russia has also gone from being a close partner of Israel to—after the October 7 attack—strengthening its ties with Hamas. The Biden administration, for its part, has been working tirelessly with partners in the Middle East and beyond to end the conflict and suffering in Gaza, find a diplomatic solution that enables Israelis and Lebanese to live in safety on both sides of the border, manage the risk of a wider regional war, and work toward greater integration and normalization in the region, including between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
These efforts are interdependent. Without an end to the war in Gaza and a time-bound, credible path to statehood that addresses the Palestinians’ legitimate aspirations and Israel’s security needs, normalization cannot move forward. But if these efforts succeed, normalization would join Israel to a regional security architecture, unlock economic opportunities across the region, and isolate Iran and its proxies. Glimmers of such integration were on display in the coalition of countries, including Arab states, that helped Israel defend itself against an unprecedented direct attack from Iran in April. My visits to the region since October 7
have affirmed that there is a path toward greater peace and integration—if leaders there are willing to take hard decisions.
Relentless as our efforts are, the human consequences of the war in Gaza continue to be devastating. Tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians have been killed in a conflict they did not start and cannot stop. Virtually the entire population of Gaza has been displaced, and the vast majority is suffering from malnutrition. Around 100 hostages remain in Gaza, either already killed or still being held in brutal conditions by Hamas. All this suffering adds even greater urgency to our efforts to end the conflict, prevent it from being repeated, and lay the foundation for lasting peace and security in the region.
MAKING A STRONGER OFFER
For many developing and emerging-market countries, great-power competition in the past meant being told to pick a side in a contest that felt far removed from their daily struggles. Many have expressed concern that today’s rivalry is no different. And some worry that the United States’ focus on domestic renewal and strategic competition will come at the expense of the issues that matter most to them. Washington must demonstrate that the opposite is true.
The Biden administration’s work to fund infrastructure across the world is an attempt to do just that. No country wants infrastructure projects that are poorly built and environmentally destructive, that import or abuse workers, or that foster corruption and burden the government with unsustainable debt. Yet too often, that has been the only option. To offer a better choice, the United States and other G-7 countries launched the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment in 2022. The initiative will eventually unlock $600 billion in private capital to fund projects that are high quality and environmentally sound and empower the communities where they are built. Already, the United States is coordinating investments in railroads and ports to connect the Philippines’ economic hubs and turbocharge investment in the country. And it is making a series of infrastructure investments in a band of development that crosses Africa—connecting Angola’s port of Lobito to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia and ultimately linking the Atlantic and Indian Oceans—which will create opportunities for communities throughout the region while shoring up the supply of critical minerals crucial to leading the clean energy transition.
The United States is teaming up with partners to build and broaden digital infrastructure so that countries don’t have to give up their security and privacy to gain high-speed, affordable Internet connections. Working with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan, Washington has invested in cables that will extend digital access to 100,000 people across the Pacific Islands. And it has spearheaded similar efforts elsewhere in Asia, as well as Africa and South America.
The administration has also sought to make international institutions more inclusive. Imperfect as the United Nations and other such bodies may be, there is no substitute for their legitimacy and capabilities. Participating in and reforming them is one of the best ways to buttress the international order against efforts to tear it down. That is why under the Biden administration, the United States rejoined the World Health Organization, the UN Human Rights Council, and UNESCO. It’s also why the administration has proposed expanding the UN Security Council by adding two permanent members from Africa, one permanent member from Latin America and the Caribbean, and an elected seat for small island developing countries. This is in addition to the permanent seats we have long proposed for Germany, India, and Japan. And it’s why we pressed for the G-20 to add the African Union as a permanent member, which it did in 2023. In 2021, we supported the International Monetary Fund’s allocation of $650 billion in Special Drawing Rights to help poor countries struggling under the weight of global health, climate, and debt crises. We also pushed for reforms at the World Bank that will allow governments to defer debt payments after natural disasters and climate shocks and will expand the affordable financing available to middle-income countries. Under President Biden, the United States has quadrupled climate financing to developing nations to help them meet their climate targets and helped more than half a billion people manage the effects of climate change.
Time and again, the Biden administration has demonstrated that the United States is the country others can rely on to help solve their biggest problems. When the war in Ukraine exacerbated the global food security crisis, for example, the United States invested $17.5 billion to tackle food insecurity and rallied more than 100 countries to take concrete steps to address the challenge and its root causes. It did all this while continuing to be the largest donor, by far, of lifesaving humanitarian aid around the world.
THE HOME FRONT
Although some Americans favor greater unilateralism and isolationism, there is in fact broad support for the pillars of the Biden administration’s strategy. The CHIPS and Science Act and multiple rounds of funding for Ukraine and Taiwan passed in Congress with bipartisan support. Democrats and Republicans in both houses are committed to strengthening U.S. alliances. And in poll after poll, most Americans see principled and disciplined U.S. leadership in the world as vital.
Cementing this alignment is crucial to convincing allies and rivals alike that although the party in power in Washington can change, the pillars of U.S. foreign policy will not. That will give allies the confidence that the United States can be trusted to stay by their side, which in turn will make them more reliable allies for the United States. And it will allow Washington to continue to meet its rivals from a position of strength, since they will know that American power is rooted not only in the firm commitments of the U.S. government but also in the unshakable convictions of the American people.
As secretary of state, I don’t do politics; I do policy. And policy is about choices. From day one, President Biden and Vice President Harris made a foundational choice that in a more competitive and combustible world, the United States cannot go it alone. If America wants to protect its security and create opportunities for its people, it must stand with those who have a stake in a free, open, secure, and prosperous world and stand up to those who threaten that world. The choices the United States makes in the second half of this decisive decade will determine whether this moment of testing remains a time of renewal or returns to a time of regression—whether Washington and its allies can continue to outcompete the forces of revisionism or allow their vision to define the twenty-first century.