When U.S. President Joe Biden leaves office in January, the already faint prospect of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may follow him out the door. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejects the very concept. Biden’s successor, President-elect Donald Trump, spent his first term actively promoting Netanyahu’s most expansionist dreams. Biden has so far failed to achieve his highest goals for the Middle East—but in his final days he can single-handedly reset the Israeli-Palestinian equation, preserve the potential for a two-state solution, and rescue much of his tarnished legacy. His status as a lame duck paradoxically gives him the power to do things possible only for a leader whose next step is retirement.
Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the only moments when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has seemed potentially solvable have been times when the United States has taken charge. And domestic politics have always limited the amount of pressure any American president can apply. Biden now has an opportunity that none of his predecessors had: he has been relieved of all domestic political constraints at a moment when U.S. pressure is clearly needed. Each of his predecessors has had a lame duck period, but none have coincided with such a decisive moment in the conflict.
The status quo suits nobody. Palestinians are the most obvious victims. In the past year, Israeli forces have killed over 40,000 people in Gaza, as well as around 700 in the West Bank (where Hamas is not in control). Israel is ensnared in a trap of its own making: it cannot retain its identity as both a democracy and a constitutionally Jewish state while maintaining an occupation through which it rules over five million Palestinians who are not citizens of Israel. The United States, by providing diplomatic cover for an occupation that most of the world considers illegal—and by providing the weaponry on which this occupation relies—has torpedoed its credibility, limiting its ability to champion international law and criticize bad actors such as China, Iran, and Russia. Something must give.
Biden’s personal warmth for the Israeli people runs deep, but it is not exclusive. I saw this firsthand when I worked for him for nine years on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I had no experience in government, having trained as an anthropologist who specialized in Islam. Biden hired me to help him understand communities across the Middle East and Asia with which he had little experience. Empathy is Biden’s superpower, and I have seen him display it frequently for people well outside his circle of familiarity. It is past time for him to demonstrate genuine empathy for the Palestinian people, who have suffered immensely during an Israeli onslaught that Biden’s own policies have enabled.
There are three significant steps Biden could take during his final weeks, purely through executive action, that would mitigate Palestinian suffering and preserve the possibility of a two-state solution—which would also be the best way to solidify Israel’s security in the long run. Biden should recognize Palestinian statehood, sponsor a resolution on a two-state solution at the UN Security Council, and enforce existing U.S. legislation on arms transfers. These three actions would be relatively simple—and difficult to undo. And together, they could help change the trajectory of the Middle East, which is hurtling toward catastrophe.
GETTING IT DONE
Recognizing Palestinian statehood isn’t nearly as radical as it sounds. Currently, 146 of the 193 countries in the UN recognize Palestinian statehood, including more than a dozen NATO allies. If the United States shifted its position, the rest of the international holdouts might likewise do so overnight. Biden should recognize Palestine the same way President Harry Truman recognized the state of Israel in 1948, just 11 minutes after the nation’s self-creation: with a stroke of the pen. In Truman’s case, official recognition consisted merely of a typewritten statement that read, “This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the provisional Government thereof. The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel.” At the time, the armies of Israel and four of its neighbors were still fighting over the UN’s plan for two nations—one Jewish and one Palestinian—and the language of this presidential recognition did not bind the United States to support any specific details of an eventual settlement. Biden should draft a similarly simple statement, or even use Truman’s bare-bones formulation as his model.
Biden should also sponsor a UN Security Council resolution to establish an international consensus for a two-state solution. The current international framework for the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains limited to Security Council resolutions 242, 338, and 1397. Resolutions 242 and 338, passed in the immediate aftermath of the Six-Day War of 1967 and the 1973 war, respectively, call for a cessation of fighting and return of territories captured (presumably, to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria). Neither resolution says anything about the Palestinian inhabitants of these territories or even mentions the word “Palestinian.” Resolution 1397, passed in 2002, merely affirms “a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders.”
Biden could organize the passage of a resolution that explicitly recognizes a sovereign Palestinian nation in the territories Israel has occupied since 1967. There are no likely vetoes: China and Russia already recognize Palestinian statehood, and leaders from France and the United Kingdom have, over the past year, signaled their willingness to grant such recognition before a negotiated settlement is complete.
No lame duck period has coincided with such a decisive moment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Finally, Biden must enforce existing U.S. laws regarding arms transfers to Israel. One of the worst-kept secrets in Washington is now out in the open: U.S. laws on arms transfers have an invisible asterisk for Israel. There are at least two major pieces of legislation that are long overdue for application. The so-called Leahy law—or more properly, Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended in January 2014—governs U.S. military aid dispersed by the Department of State. (This measure, and another that governs aid dispersed by the Department of Defense, gets its name from its sponsor, Patrick Leahy, a Democrat from Vermont who served as a U.S. senator from 1975 to 2023 and who was a leading congressional advocate of human rights.) Its language is unambiguous: “No assistance shall be furnished under this Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.”
This law applies to all countries receiving U.S. military assistance. “Department officials insist that Israeli units are subject to the same vetting standards as units from any other country,” Charles Blaha, a recently retired diplomat, wrote in June 2024. “Maybe in theory. But in practice, that’s simply not true.” His words carried particular weight: for seven and a half years, Blaha was the State Department official in charge of vetting transfers to make sure they complied with the Leahy law. A few weeks earlier, Leahy himself, now retired, had also blown the whistle: “Since the Leahy law was passed, not a single Israeli security force unit has been deemed ineligible for U.S. aid,” he wrote, “despite repeated, credible reports of gross violations of human rights and a pattern of failing to appropriately punish Israeli soldiers and police who violate the rights of Palestinians.”
The arrest warrants issued last week by the International Criminal Court for Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant seem to constitute “credible information” of gross violation of human rights—as would a large number of other well-documented actions by Israeli authorities since October 2023. The State Department has received nearly 500 reports of Israel using U.S.-supplied weapons in attacks on civilians in Gaza. After Israel’s invasion of Lebanon last month, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights accused Israel of committing “atrocities in Lebanon, including acts of violence intended to spread terror among civilians and indiscriminate warfare.”
The second piece of legislation that Biden should enforce is the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. This statute forbids all arms transfers to any country that “prohibits or otherwise restricts the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance to any other country.” Israel’s persistent refusal to permit more than a dribble of aid into Gaza led the Biden administration to spend $230 million constructing an elaborate floating pier this spring—which was operational for only three weeks and managed to deliver even less aid during that time than the trickle that flowed in by road in just four days during the same period. In August, an oversight report by the Inspector General of the U.S. Agency for International Development determined that the Israel Defense Forces had improperly prioritized their own operational and security requirements over the delivery of humanitarian aid.
Three weeks before Election Day, the U.S. secretaries of state and defense publicly informed Israel that it had one month to make good on promises it had made in March of this year to remove impediments to humanitarian efforts, specifically citing the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. But the deadline passed on November 12 without any American response. Netanyahu successfully called Biden’s bluff.
LOCKED IN
Could any of these executive actions survive the presidential transition? After all, Trump spent his first term enabling Netanyahu’s agenda, and his cabinet picks suggest his administration will do little to rein in Israel.
Trump could try to wheel back the application of relevant laws governing the transfer of arms. The Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act contains a presidential waiver, so he could undo any decision to invoke it without suffering much more than international ridicule. But the Leahy law that governs the State Department contains no such loophole. Once the department has officially acknowledged that “credible information” of gross human rights violations exists, it legally cannot decide to continue delivering weapons. Trump could not legally instruct his secretary of state to simply determine the Leahy requirements had been met. The only legal off-ramp would be a carefully calibrated process by which the parties guilty of gross abuses are “remediated”—meaning that the only pathway out of a Leahy prohibition for a country deemed guilty of gross human rights violations is to stop committing gross human rights abuses.
Trump could try to revoke recognition of a Palestinian state. But there is no precedent for such an action. The United States has formally recognized nearly 200 states, but it has never, as far as I can determine, formally recognized the nonexistence of one. Trump can direct his lawyers to declare anything he wishes, but once nearly every country in the world has acknowledged Palestinian statehood, it would be a rather lonely fight. And a UN Security Council resolution mandating a two-state solution would be beyond the ability of any American president to overturn.
Recognizing Palestinian statehood isn’t nearly as radical as it sounds.
This program of executive action would hardly create a new peace process, but its effect would be significant. First, it would keep the prospect of Palestinian self-determination alive, albeit on life support; without such action, Israel is likely to annex some or all of the occupied territories over the next four years. Second, it might change the political dynamic within Israel itself: a two-state solution remains the only possible way for Israel to retain its identity, and Netanyahu’s far-right government remains deeply unpopular. Third, it would give the United States the leverage to pressure Israel into a history-making deal; Trump has displayed no sympathy for the Palestinians, but he has demonstrated a deep desire to go down in history as a geopolitical deal-maker.
Less than two years ago, Biden’s legacy was being compared with that of one of the greatest American presidents, Franklin Roosevelt. Today, no one is making such comparisons, and many Democrats and progressives have denounced Biden’s conduct on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A far-sighted move could provide a better ending to the foreign policy chapter of his story, as a president who rallied a global coalition to defend freedom, democracy, and human rights not just for Ukrainians but for Palestinians, as well.
Over the past year, Biden has not shown himself to be bold, let alone radical. But throughout his career, he has constantly surprised those who pegged him as the most predictable man in Washington. I do not know whether the Biden of 2024 will decide to finish his public life with a brave, heroic gesture. But the Biden I worked for would have already directed his team to draw up such a plan.
JONAH BLANK is Adjunct Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and a Visiting Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute. From 1999 to 2009, he served as Senator Joe Biden’s Policy Director for South and Southeast Asia, and from 1999 to 2001 he also advised the senator on the Middle East.