A Conversation With Philip Gordon on the Pitfalls and Opportunities of Trump’s Cease-Fire Deal
On October 8, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Hamas and Israel had agreed to a cease-fire deal in Gaza. According to initial reporting, Hamas will free the remaining Israeli hostages in Gaza; in return, Israel will free hundreds of Palestinian prisoners and withdraw its troops from part of the enclave. Although Trump’s 20-point proposal aims to bring sustained peace to Gaza and address long-standing drivers of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the next steps and many of the thorniest issues remain unsettled — raising the question of whether a cease-fire will open up real progress toward ending the war or offer just a brief respite.
Foreign Affairs Editor Daniel Kurtz-Phelan spoke with Philip Gordon about what the deal means for Israel, Gaza, and the wider world, and what may happen from here. Gordon has long experience as both a practitioner and scholar of U.S. Middle East policy. He served as National Security Adviser to U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris and as the National Security Council’s Middle East Coordinator during the Obama administration. His many books include Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East. Gordon and Kurtz-Phelan spoke the morning of Thursday, October 8. Their conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
Does this deal mean, as Trump says, “peace in the Middle East”?
It is an extraordinary day, and if hostages are released as announced, and there is even a temporary cease-fire that provides some relief to the people of Gaza, we should rejoice. But the deal is a long way from “peace in the Middle East.” I would call it more of a respite from the hell of the past two years and an opportunity to move forward.
How did we get to this breakthrough? What combination of factors on the ground and outside pressure, whether from Trump or from Arab governments, pushed Israel and Hamas to this point?
There were short-term factors and longer-terms ones. In the short term, Trump’s pressure on [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu made the prime minister more open to a deal, especially following the failed Israeli strike on Qatar, which is a U.S. partner. And Hamas, already devasted militarily, no doubt wanted to avoid even more damage from the latest Israeli offensive or Trump’s blame for scuttling the deal.
But I think longer-term factors were even more important. The hostages were becoming a wasting asset for Hamas—holding them was not leading Israel to compromise, and if more of them died they would provide even less leverage. At some point, as in the past, it would always make sense for Hamas to trade them for something—in this case large numbers of Palestinian prisoners and detainees and a pullback of the Israel Defense Forces [IDF].
On the Israeli side, there was also always going to be a time when Netanyahu would want a deal. For two years, he insisted on nothing other than “total victory.” That helped him reduce Hamas’s military capability, eliminate much of its leadership, and keep his governing coalition together. But he eventually has to hold new elections, at the latest by next year, and he certainly didn’t want to run for reelection with a full-scale war going on and Israeli hostages still in Gaza.
Still, how did Trump get Netanyahu to finally agree to peace?
Netanyahu had to make some difficult concessions—including the release of numerous Palestinian prisoners—but don’t overlook the fact that that Trump’s deal met virtually all his key demands: Hamas’s disarmament, its exclusion from governance “directly or indirectly,” a technocratic government under a board overseen by Trump and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, IDF discretion over when conditions are met for full withdrawal, a buffer zone in Gaza, a call for reform of the Palestinian Authority, and no concrete commitment to a Palestinian state. Netanyahu had to rule out an Israeli occupation of Gaza and Jewish settlements there—but while those may have been priorities for part of his coalition, they would only have created headaches for him. If this deal is implemented in full, and that of course is a big “if,” Netanyahu could sell it as the “total victory” he promised.
Do you think it will be implemented in full?
Certainly not any time soon. Again, a cease-fire or hostage deal alone is a tremendous achievement and will bring much relief. But there is scant detail about the rest, and the parties will begin haggling immediately over every aspect of implementation. Hamas may commit to some version of disarmament, but its militant ideology, desire for influence over Gaza’s future, and the presence of the IDF will give it a thousand reasons not to give up its arms, and its failure to do so, in turn, will give the IDF reason to stay—a vicious circle. Having Palestinian technocrats deal with governance will also be a huge challenge, especially given Israeli objections to people associated with the Palestinian Authority, the only Palestinian governing body that currently exists aside from Hamas. And the Arab-international force that is supposed to provide security, which is a precondition for Hamas’s disarmament and IDF withdrawal, doesn’t currently exist. No Arab government will want to send forces to Gaza until they are confident that Hamas will not resist and that they will not be fighting alongside the IDF. Those governments certainly do not want to get caught in the crossfire if and when Israel does launch counterterrorism operations against Hamas. So that will be a long and difficult process, too—and in the meantime, the risk of continued Hamas-Israeli fighting remains high.
Are you concerned that Netanyahu will simply relaunch the war once the hostages are out? Would Arab states or Trump or anyone else have any meaningful leverage in that situation?
That is certainly a real possibility, and one of the reasons why Hamas has been so reluctant to let the hostages go without international guarantees that the war won’t resume. Of course, risks to the hostages and public pressure in Israel to release them did not prevent Netanyahu from continuing military operations in the past, but whatever constraints the hostages placed on those operations will be gone if they are released. And you can be sure that in the coming weeks and months, Hamas will give Netanyahu plenty of pretexts to resume military action. This is where Trump and United States come in. If and when a cease-fire takes hold and the hostages are out, the main barrier to resuming the war could be pressure from Trump, who will not want his prized deal to fall apart. The Israeli public also wants to see the war end, but if Hamas refuses to disarm or continues attacks on Israeli soldiers or civilians, Netanyahu will not hesitate to start the war again, or at least resume targeted military action.
Do you share the view that only Trump could get this deal done? Does he deserve the Nobel Peace Prize?
The Trump administration deserves credit for maneuvering the parties toward an agreement. As the past two years have demonstrated, that is no easy task. But I think the narrative that Trump uniquely bullied Netanyahu into a peace deal is wildly overstated, including by Trump himself and by the many Israelis who want to see their prime minster humiliated. Don’t forget the background here. Trump inherited a functioning cease-fire (that he had contributed to) in January 2025. Israel then broke that deal in March, resuming major military operations, and went on to impose a full blockade on Gaza—no food, water, or medicine—for over two months, leading to widespread starvation and horrific humanitarian conditions. Trump did nothing about that and gave Netanyahu a green light to “finish the job.” Then he let six more months go by without putting any pressure on Netanyahu to end the war. He finally took action in September, after the Israeli strike on Doha. He drafted a peace plan with some Arab partners, but then accepted Netanyahu’s changes to that plan. So yes, Trump’s pressure was helpful, but let’s put it in perspective. It was not so much that Trump made specific threats to Netanyahu but that he offered him a peace deal that met his core demands.
Does this outcome make you think differently about the Biden administration’s approach to the war? Were critics right that more pressure, and more public pressure, on Netanyahu could in fact move him? What would you do differently knowing where we are?
As noted, there were a range of factors that led to this deal happening now as opposed to some other time over the past two years. They included growing Israeli war fatigue, Hamas’s military defeat, the waning leverage Hamas got from holding hostages, the backlash from the Israeli strikes in Doha, and growing pressure on Hamas from Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey, all of which are desperate for good relations with the United States. All that said, yes, I think that although Biden was initially correct to support Israel’s right and need to respond to Hamas’s horrific October 7 attack, he should have used more leverage and more quickly pressed for Israel to end the war, both in his public and private statements and in his actions. Over time, the costs and consequences of Israeli military operations—including the deaths of so many civilians in Gaza and the horrific humanitarian conditions there—far outweighed the benefits of continued military operations, and the United States should have done more, sooner, to try to end the war.
Do you think this deal will help Netanyahu stay in power or win the next elections?
I would never try to predict the outcome of any election, and certainly not Israel’s, given how close all the recent ones have been and the vast range of possible coalitions. On one hand, if this deal holds, Netanyahu will be well placed to present himself, as usual, as “Mr. Security.” He defied international pressure for two years and achieved a version of “total victory,” with Hamas decimated and Israel still effectively in control of Gaza—and in the meantime, he largely eliminated the threat Israel faced from Hezbollah in Lebanon and from Iran’s nuclear program. He’ll be able to say he avenged Israel’s victims, ended the war on his terms, and got the remaining hostages out.
On the other hand, with the war over, much of Netanyahu’s case for remaining in power as wartime leader will disappear. Opposition parties will focus on his responsibility for letting October 7 happen in the first place, his unpopular policies such as the judicial reforms that weakened the independence of Israel’s courts and legal system, and his various corruption trials. They will emphasize how his policies damaged Israel’s economy and left Israel isolated in the world.
Do you see any meaningful vision or plausible path for Palestinian governance in the plan or talks so far? The details seem quite vague.
The details are vague indeed. Some observers have been pointing to Netanyahu’s having to accept a reference to Palestinian statehood and self-determination as reason to be hopeful. But I think that has it backward. There is no commitment to a pathway to a Palestinian state. All the deal says is that as Gaza development advances and when the Palestinian Authority is reformed, “the conditions may finally be in place” for a pathway to Palestinian statehood and self-determination. That is very far from a commitment, and in fact Netanyahu has committed to preventing a Palestinian state—which most Israelis now strongly oppose anyway.
So is the two-state solution dead?
No one can talk with a straight face about a two-state solution as a realistic near-term prospect today, given Israeli hostility and disarray among Palestinians. But the alternatives to a two-state solution remain equally unrealistic or unacceptable. One is a single state with equal rights for Palestinians and Jews, which would be wonderful but is simply impracticable given attitudes on both sides. The other alternative is essentially a form of apartheid, with Palestinians isolated into enclaves surrounded by Jewish settlers. At some point, the Israelis will have to accept they and the Palestinians would both be better off if the Palestinians had a state of their own. There are a lot of different forms that state could take, but I remain convinced they are all better than either a true multinational single state or an even-worse version of the status quo that denies Palestinians self-determination and security.
Where does this deal leave things in the West Bank?
That’s an important question because with all the world’s attention understandably on Gaza, it’s easy to overlook the dangerously deteriorating situation there. Since October 7, 2023, Israeli settlements and outposts have been expanding, often with the specific purpose of preventing a Palestinian state, and settler violence is rising to unprecedented levels. Israel is deliberately undermining the governing Palestinian Authority, including by withholding its revenues. This Israeli government wants to delegitimize the PA as a way to avoid supporting a Palestinian state. Meanwhile the Trump administration has done nothing to stop this creeping, de facto annexation. It even lifted Biden-era sanctions against violent settlers and says the Israeli settlement policy is up to the Israelis. That policy is a recipe for PA collapse and further violence and instability, and yet Trump is just going along with it.
Do you foresee progress toward normalization between Israel and other regional governments, especially Saudi Arabia? What’s the real Saudi bottom line?
The Palestinian issue was never a priority for the current government of Saudi Arabia, but there was no way it could normalize relations with Israel as long as the war in Gaza was going on. With the end of the war—if the war does end—there is a chance Riyadh will start thinking about it again. But normalization seems a long way off. The prerequisite for any eventual Israeli-Saudi agreement is a genuine path to Palestinian self-determination. If the incentive of Saudi normalization leads Israel to provide that path, it would be good for everyone involved.
The war in Gaza has isolated Israel from much of the world. It faces genocide charges, and some of its closest partners have recognized a Palestinian state. Will Israel be able to repair its reputation in the months ahead?
That’s going to be long and difficult task, one that takes much longer than months, and will depend on Israeli actions. The conduct of the war in Gaza—which was initially broadly, globally supported after the horrors of October 7, 2023—has made Israel into a pariah state in the eyes of many around the world. An entire generation, including an entire generation of Americans, no longer sees it as a sympathetic, democratic victim surrounded by hostile neighbors, but as a regional hegemon responsible for tens of thousands of civilian deaths and the greatest humanitarian catastrophe in their lifetime.
The end of the war in Gaza, if it does end, would provide Israel an opportunity to start to reverse that perception. But it will require delivering on the promise of providing relief, rebuilding, opportunity, respect, and self-determination for Palestinians, not just in Gaza but also in the West Bank. The end of the war in Gaza is a necessary condition for beginning the process of restoring Israel’s international reputation, but not a sufficient one.