Geopolitics refers to conditions that influence the economic and foreign policy inter
actions among states. A geopolitical transition, in turn, introduces changes in political
alliances, in military technologies and weapons systems, in defense budget outlays, and
in a supporting industrial base—all the variables that influence a military force posture
intended to meet anticipated conflict scenarios.
The world currently is in such a transition—from the Cold War era that extended roughly
from the end of World War II to 1991 to a new era that we and others term the “strategic
competition era.” This essay argues that the foreign policy and international economic
issues arising in this strategic competition era require a radically different US national
security structure than the one created for the Cold War era. The policies and insti
tutions of the US defense apparatus were responses to the nature of the geopolitical
environment that we then faced. Today’s very different geopolitical landscape also
requires its own approach and institutional frameworks rather than inherited systems
from the past.
A key change in the current transition is China’s rapid rise to a global military and eco
nomic power. For example, if China’s nuclear arsenal increases from six hundred war
heads in 2024 to perhaps fifteen hundred and is deployed not only on intercontinental
missiles but also by capable long-range bombers and submarines, the world will shift
from a bipolar to a tripolar nuclear world. In such a world, what is our understanding of
how to establish deterrence or whether the valued US nuclear umbrella will still be effec
tive for our allies?
The transition to the strategic competition era introduces new security-linked economic
and business dynamics, as well. Transformative technologies such as artificial intelli
gence, quantum computing, ubiquitous space-based communications, and relatively
inexpensive unmanned vehicles, for example, are being developed primarily by the com
mercial sector in both the United States and China. But as demonstrated already in the wars in Ukraine and in Iran, they have direct implications for the effectiveness and sur
vivability of deployed conventional US land, sea, and air combat systems.
More broadly, US manufacturing economic competitiveness and capacity are arguably
declining relative to China and some of our partner nations in the Indo-Pacific, while
it is improving relative to Europe. This has implications for international trade in raw or
refined critical materials, in intermediate components such as steel, and in advanced
manufactured products such as batteries and semiconductors. Tariffs are a wild card. In
a more dangerous world, what are the options for benefiting from comparative advan
tage through trade while reducing vulnerability to coercion in critical supply chains?
This essay draws on the experiences in government of one of its coauthors to describe
the changes needed for the United States to manage the transition from the national
security posture in the Cold War era to the strategic competition era.
Read more here.